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This paper studies how much family characteristics affect early career outcomes (earnings) 
of children in seven European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Austria using ECHP. To asses the overall importance of family influence an indicator 
of family effect on earnings, the siblings’ earnings correlations is computed, using the eight 
waves of ECHP data on siblings. Portugal is the country with the highest siblings’ 
correlation in earnings followed by Italy, Greece, Spain and France. Germany and Austria 
turned out to have a very low siblings’ correlation in earnings. The correlation increases 
when the same gender siblings samples are used in almost all countries. These findings 
may suggest that the earnings correlation of siblings of different gender is lower because of 
labor market discrimination against female. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic literature on intergenerational mobility has grown in the past decades 
because intergenerational transmitted inequality has become an important issue in those 
countries where income inequality is increasing. Recently, OECD (2008) recorded the 
widening of income distribution from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, in Germany, Italy 
and Portugal and a decline in France and Greece. 
It has been well established that an individual socio-economic success in the labor 
market depends by her family background. Recent studies suggest the existence of strong 
intergenerational link in earnings driven by a high persistence in education within each 
family in many different countries (Corak ,2006 and Bjorklund et al, 2002). While cross-
country comparable estimates of Intergenerational income elasticity are available for some 
European countries (Germany, France and Italy) (Corak, 2006), there is a lack of 
comparative studies as regards other Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece). 
The aim of this paper is to measure how much family characteristics affect early 
career outcomes of children in seven European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Austria. Cross country comparison of countries with differences in 
social habits and labor market characteristics yields better understanding of the effect of 
specific national institutions on the relative importance of family background in the early 
career  
Siblings correlation in earnings measures how much of the observed earnings can be 
attributed to factors that siblings share, observed and unobserved family and community 
characteristics, and thus can be considered a good measure of the overall importance of 
family background. It is a broader measure than parent-child earnings elasticity because it 
captures both observable and unobservable parents characteristic. Solon (1999) reviewed 
the empirical literature on siblings’ correlations in earnings and showed that very 
heterogeneous studies produce estimations in the range of .15 and .42 for the United 
States. Recently, Mazumder (2008) has updated results fro the US and has found a 
correlations around .5. The only other countries for which this statistic is available are the 
Nordic countries
2 covered by Bjorklund et al. ( 2002); in these countries the correlations 
are lower than the US and are between .2 and .3. 
                                                
Exploiting the longitudinal design of ECHP, each individual could be matched with 
her siblings and observed while moving the first steps in the labour market. In this case the 
estimated correlations may be interpreted as correlations in the early career earnings. 
 
2 Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway. 
  2 Family influence may be stronger in the early career steps, a period in life in which 
families ties are stronger and can provide children with a better and easier way to enter in 
the labour market. The role of networks in the school to work transition has been well 
documented (for a review see Margolis and Simonnet, 2003 or Bentolilla et al., 2004). 
Indeed, informal contacts as a mean to find a job are quite common in Europe, as it is 
documented by Pellizzari (2004). It turns out that about one third
3 of the jobs in 1996 in 
Europe have been found through informal network. This percentage ranges from 25 




2. The estimation strategy 
 
 
Following previous literature (see Solon, 1999), I model the economic outcome as: 
yijt =Xijt +ijt       ( 1 )  
where yijt is the logarithm of the outcome in year t (t=1,...,Tij) for the jth (j=1..J) sibling 
in family i (i=1,...N); Xijt is a vector that contains (a polynomium in ) age to account for 
lifecycle effect and years dummies to account for business cycle. The variables in X can be 
treated as fixed effects (Mazumder, 2008). The residual purged from these effects captures 
permanent components of earnings and could be decomposed into three random effects 
terms: 
ijt = ai+uij+vijt       ( 2 )  
where the first term ai is the component common to all siblings in the family i; uij is the  
component that is individual specific and vijt is the transitory component. In line with 
previous studies, these three components are assumed to be “orthogonal by construction” 









v       ( 3 )  
Where 
2
a is the variance in permanent earnings due to differences between families,  

2
u is the variance due to differences within families. These two components could be used 









        ( 4 )  
                                                 
3 Author elaboration on the percentage reported in table 3, pag 31 of  Pellizzari (2004). This figure is the average 
computed on the countries I use in this paper. 
  3This correlation can be interpreted as the proportion of the population variance in 
long-run earnings due to what is shared by siblings. 
The three variance components are estimated using a restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation method which is more suitable for unbalanced panel than the classical ANOVA 
formulas and produces consistent estimations (For a discussion see Mazumder, 2008). 
Mazumder (2008) presents some sensitivity tests of singletons inclusion versus their 
exclusion and concludes that the inclusion of singletons does not change the estimation of 
sibling’s correlations. Thus singletons are included in my the estimation samples, and I will 
present results also separately for sisters pairs and only brothers pair. In this case,  siblings 
of different sex are split and included in the right sample as singletons. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The European Community Household Panel
4 is a large-scale household survey that 
covers most member countries in the European Union. Rather than trying to harmonize 
output from national surveys, the European statistical agency (Eurostat) adopts an input 
oriented approach and uses the same community questionnaire as the base for the 
national versions of the survey. Thus a desirable feature of ECHP is that the definitions 
of and questions on earnings, the reference period and the survey methods are common 
across countries. Furthermore individuals of the original sample are followed over time 
even when they leave the original family. This sample design allow me to match them 
with their siblings.  
Exploiting the longitudinal design of the survey and using the personal link file, 
each individual could be matched with her siblings if she lived in the same household at 
least for a wave. Lone children are  also in included in the sample as singletons. 
Only individuals aged between 22 and 39 with a positive earnings in at least a year 
and which declare themselves to be working with an employer in paid employment (more 
than 15 hours a week), in paid apprenticeship or training (more than 15 hours a week) (i.e 
individuals must not be in formal education or self-employed) are selected. The earnings 
variable I use is the monthly  (gross ) earnings  of the month prior to the interview, and I 
exclude individuals belonging to the first and last percentile of the specific country-wage 
distribution. I end up with about 2 thousand individuals for each country, ranging from 
1267 in Austria to 3600 in Spain. 
Good data containing information for many brothers in many years are scarce and 
so estimations of siblings correlations have almost been done using small sample. Solon 
                                                 
4 ECHP UDB – version of December 2003. 
  4(1999) in reviewing the literature on siblings correlations, shows that the vast majority of 
these studies have used few hundreds of family. More recently some bigger samples have 
been used to this purpose, as for example in Bijorklund et alii (2002) in which the authors 
use registry files of Scandinavian countries with data from several thousand of families. 
Their results are compared with estimation obtained from the PSID (US panel) in which 
they use about 9 hundreds of families. Mazumder (2008) extend the estimation sample of 
Solon and is able to use around 5 thousands individuals observed for more than ten years. 
My samples are bigger than those used in the oldest papers, but smaller than those used in 
more recent papers. 
  Table 1 contains the samples means. As it can be seen, the average age is almost 
similar across countries, slightly higher in Italy, probably reflecting the same cohabitation 
with parents habits (Iacovou, 2001) and indicating that, in all the countries considered, the 
sample selection leads to similar samples. The average monthly gross wage (converted in 
2000 euro) reflects the young age of my samples. In the middle and bottom panels I 
reports averages of the relevant variables also for only  sisters and brothers samples. On 
average female wages are lower than males ones. 
 





Table 2 shows the estimated correlations, for all siblings and separately for sisters and 
brothers, the bootstrapped standard errors and the confidence intervals. All the estimated 
correlations are statistically significant. The main results are those obtained with all siblings 
together, because more observations per family are used and thus better measures of the 
within family variance and a more precise estimation of the correlation are obtained. 
France and Spain have a correlation around .3, while Italy and Greece have a correlation 
around .4. Austria has a correlation of .2 and Germany has a correlation of .1. Finally 
Portugal has the higher siblings’ correlation which is near to .6  
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
In order to get a better comparison picture, in figure 1 I plot the estimated siblings 
correlations and the confidence interval for each countries. Germany and Austria have a 
  5greater degree of intergenerational mobility (lower correlations) that is statistically different 
from the degree of mobility of Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Greece). France is 
somewhere in the middle, but its estimated correlation differs significantly only from 
Germany’s. The high correlation found in Portugal is finally statically different from all the 
other countries.  
The ranking in the degree of mobility is quite similar to that obtained in other 
studies. For instance, Couch and Dunn (1997) find that Germany is a more mobile society 
than US, which was considered more mobile than Italy by Checchi et al.(2001) Finally, 
Corak (2006) reviews intergenerational income elasticity estimates and concludes that 
Germany is more mobile than France. 
The set of countries considered in this study belongs to corporatist-type welfare 
state. This means that the welfare state is family oriented, young people tend to cohabit 
longer with their parents because it can be difficult to leave parents’ house and the state 
does not protect them, for example with unemployment benefit if they loose their jobs. 
Furthermore these countries typically tend to have stricter employment protection laws to 
protect the breadwinner and disregard young people. In such a context, families react 
creating a network to protect their offspring and siblings correlations in earnings are higher 
and the effect of family characteristics on returns to education may be stronger.  
Among the corporatist countries we need to further consider the role of the Church 
and distinguish between Continental countries and Mediterranean ones. Algan and  Cahuc 
(2004) deeply analyze the positive link between traditional family values and job protection 
legislation. Studying the interaction between religions, preferences and institutions they find 
that Mediterranean Catholic countries are more likely to support “macho values” than 
Protestant. This social status gives rise to a greater degree of job protection and families 
oriented policies. My findings that Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, where the (Catholic) 
Religion has shaped the societies upon the family, are the those with the higher siblings 
earnings correlations and are in line with this hypothesis.  
The correlation increases when the same gender samples are used in almost all 
countries except France (and Greece for sisters), even thought the precision of the 
estimates is lower (confidence intervals are larger). These findings may suggest that siblings 
of the same gender tend to have more similar patterns in earnings than siblings of different 
gender. This may be due to labour market discrimination against female, as the differences 
in average wages between sisters and brothers pairs documented in table 1 suggests,  or to 
differences in family investment in children when they are of different gender. The scarce 
empirical literature existing on this last issue provides evidence that gender wage 
  6differentials, like endowment differences, are mildly reinforced by the parental allocation of 
human capital investments (Behrman and al., 1986), suggesting that a lower correlation in 
earnings between siblings of different gender may be due mainly to labour market gender 
discrimination. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper is a comparative study of how much family characteristics affect early 
career outcomes (wages) of children in seven European countries: Germany, France,  Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Austria. To asses the overall importance of family influence I 
compute a broad indicator of family effect on earnings, the siblings earnings correlations, 
using the eight waves of ECHP data on siblings. This indicator measures how much of the 
observed earnings can be attributed to what siblings share: family and community 
background observed and unobserved characteristics. I find that Portugal is the country 
with the highest correlation, followed by Italy, Spain and Greece. In these countries the 
Religious traditions as well as culture and traditional habits shaped the societies upon the 
family, and moreover, they are characterized by very strict employment protection laws, 
and so family influence in the early career period is greater. 
The correlation increases when the same gender siblings samples are used in almost 
all countries. These findings may suggest that the earnings correlation of siblings of 
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  9Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 Germany  France  Italy  Greece  Spain    Portugal  Austria 
All siblings pairs 
Age  26.9 26.6 28.4 28.1 27.9 27.4 27.1 
Average Monthly Gross 
Wage (1)  1640.3 1173.7 1076.5  684.5 914.6 508.2  1511.5 
N  individuals  2011 1804 3337 1834 3677 2681 1276 
N  family  1582 1397 2419 1378 2489 1862  905 
N  obs  6826  5454 11730 5946 11109  10127 4373 
Sisters pairs 
Age  25.7 26.4 28.2 27.5 27.9 27.6 26.4 
Average Monthly Gross 
Wage (1)  1341.4 1116.1  981.5  634.9 836.12 492.3 1282.9 
N  individuals  798  730 1317 742 1560  1117 493 
N  family  720  639 1129 654 1314 950  432 
N  obs  2559 2143 4507 2215 4533 4028 1602 
Brothers pairs 
Age  27.5 26.8 28.5 28.4 27.9 27.3 27.6 
Average Monthly Gross 
Wage (1)  1824.6 1211.4 1137.3  714.6 968.5 518.7  1645.7 
N  individuals  1227 1073 1660  923  2116 1231  778 
N  family  1037 1073 2021 1091 1664 1563  618 
N  obs  4267 3313 7219 3726 6577 6099 2772 
Notes:  (1) in euro in 2000 prices. 
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Table 2: Siblings correlations and components of earnings inequality 
 
All siblings pairs 



































  .030 .027 .028 .037 .064 .019 
2u  .166 .074 .042 .042 .080 .047 .066 


































2a  .035 .028 .040 .026 .082 .088 .043 
2u  .127 .084 .042 .041 .070 .046 .043 


























































Notes: Bootstrapped standard error within parenthesis in italics. All the variance components estimates are statistically 
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